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The Effects of Communication on the Partnership Solution to the Commons  
 
“There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication”. 
 
-John Dewey 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the late 1950s, economists have been searching for solutions to social dilemmas. One solution that 
has harnessed much support is allowing communication even when it is merely nonbinding “cheap talk” 
(Sally 1995; Bicchieri 2002; Balliet 2010).1  Experimental studies have shown that communication in 
common pool resources (CPRs) and voluntary contribution public good games improves cooperation and 
can overcome tragedy-of-the-commons and free-riding behavior (Isaac and Walker 1988; Hackett et al. 
1994; Ostrom et al. 1994; Ledyard 1995; Chan et al. 1999; Kinukawa et al. 2000; Ahn et al. 2010).  These 
studies suggest that the decentralized governance of CPRs and public goods is possible as long as agents 
are able to communicate with each other on a repeated basis.  This conclusion on the positive effect of 
communication is drawn when considering only conflicts between individual and collective interest.  
There is a lack of studies that systematically examine whether and to what extent we can generalize this 
result to situations where multi-level conflicts exist on the individual, group and collective levels. 
Researchers have long recognized that many social dilemmas involve multi-level interactions 
because groups instead of individuals are competing in providing public goods, extracting from CPRs or 
competing for market shares.  The interplay of within-group conflict and between-group competition may 
sometimes mitigate the efficiency loss caused by each.  Investigation of these complicated multi-level 
collective action problems has led to the invention of some clever methods to combine these competing 
forces and achieve better outcomes.  Prominent examples include using inter-group competition to reduce 
free riding in within-group conflicts (Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport 2005) and creating within-group free 
riding through the use of output-sharing groups to reduce excessive exploitation from a common pool 
(Schott 2001 and Heintzelman et al. 2009).  In the latter case, the presence of groups that must share 
output extracted from the CPR creates a situation in which over-appropriators will reduce their extraction 
effort because they will have an incentive to free-ride on the effort of their group members. But these 
studies do not consider the role of communication in these mechanisms.  
There are also several field examples of output-sharing partnerships involving common pools.  
Most traditional hunter-gatherer societies share their hunt with other households that do not necessarily 
participate in hunting or contribute to the financing of the harvest.  These practices are still quite 
                                                 
1  Note that throughout this paper we use the term “communication” to mean “non-binding and costless 
communication”. 
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dominant over large areas of the Arctic (Collings et al. 1998), in various Canadian provinces and in 
Australia whenever aboriginal groups are involved in the use and management of wildlife resources.  In 
Japan a number of inshore and midshore fishing enterprises manage their resource by pooling their catch 
and distributing revenues equally among their group members (see Yamamoto 1995; Platteau and Seki 
2001; Carpenter and Seki 2011).  Japanese fishermen who pool their catch consistently have a higher 
catch per unit of effort than those in the same fishery and fishing area who do not.  The Japanese 
fishermen’s output-sharing schemes are similar to a fixed-group sharing scheme practiced by ’Uihan 
fishermen in Tonga in the South Pacific (Bender et al. 2002).  This is in contrast with Lofangan 
fishermen, also from Tonga, who use a random-group informal sharing system (Chakraborty 2004) and 
have a significantly larger catch per unit of effort (Bender et al. 2002).  These empirical observations 
illustrate the importance of carefully examining the influence of the type of partnership organization on 
the effectiveness of common pool resource management.  
In most field contexts communication amongst individuals and groups of individuals is likely to 
be both possible and popular.  Group members could be discussing common strategies; members of 
different groups may speak with one another either to coordinate actions or to provide deceptive 
information in attempts to gain strategic advantages, and members of groups may speak with others in 
social contexts when group memberships may be unknown.  New means of electronic communication are 
evolving to allow people to communicate with others whom they never see or meet but with whom they 
work or against whom they compete.  In such naturally occurring environments, with multi-level 
interactions, many channels of communication may arise.  Different channels of communication may 
have opposing effects on the offsetting externalities.  A better understanding of the impact of 
communication is highly relevant to how mechanisms such as output-sharing groups in a CPR function 
and perform. 
We aim to bridge the literature on communication in the commons and the literature on output-
sharing and the partnership solution by carefully studying a strategic situation in the laboratory where 
communication can be a double-edged sword depending on the specific communication channels 
available on different levels of interactions.  The partnership solution to the CPR problem proposed by 
Schott (2001) provides an ideal environment for our purpose.  With this management instrument, agents 
exploiting a CPR are placed in a number of output-sharing groups or partnerships.  Members of each 
group must combine their harvest and share it equally.  Equal sharing introduces a positive externality and 
provides an incentive for agents to reduce their harvesting effort and free ride on their partners.  This 
shirking can offset the over-harvesting incentive characteristic of multiple agents appropriating from a 
common pool.  Schott et al. (2007) demonstrated this effect in laboratory experiments and showed that 
groups allocate effort efficiently when the socially optimal output-sharing group size is established.  
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Cherry et al. (2015) extend the work of Schott et al. (2007) by investigating the endogenous choice of the 
number of output-sharing groups that will form in a CPR via a voting mechanism.  Neither Schott et al. 
(2007) nor Cherry et al. (2015) address the efficacy of output sharing as a management mechanism in 
environments with communication among the appropriators from the CPR.   
The laboratory is an ideal setting to investigate communication and conflict since it allows us to 
add or remove communication channels in a controlled way so that we can tease out the main and 
interaction effects between communication and multi-level strategic interactions, which is not often 
feasible or observable in field studies.  In our experiment, communication is introduced through 
computer-mediated chat rooms that allow messages to be exchanged among all agents (global 
communication) or within specific subgroups of agents (local communication) or both within subgroups 
and among all agents (local and global communication).  Because we are considering the introduction of 
output-sharing groups into a CPR as an exogenous regulatory mechanism, we must distinguish between 
two kinds of groups.  A communication group is a subgroup of agents whose members can communicate 
with each other concerning their decisions about the effort they will commit to appropriate from the CPR. 
These are distinct from output-sharing groups, which are created subgroups of agents who equally share 
the total appropriation of the group.  Membership in the two groups may or may not consist of the same 
people.  If the memberships differ, communication among members of a communication group may not 
have the same effect on effort exerted by members of the output-sharing groups as it would if the 
membership in the two groups is the same.  This happens because it is not possible to agree to cooperate 
with a member of your output-sharing group if you do not know who is in your output-sharing group.  In 
considering local communication we distinguish two cases: linked groups in which the memberships of 
the output-sharing groups and the communication groups are the same and unlinked groups in which they 
are different.  The unlinked group reflects a world in which members of a distinct community regularly 
communicate among themselves, but are required to share output with others not necessarily from their 
community.  We also allow output-sharing group composition to remain fixed across periods or to vary 
randomly.  Random allocation to output-sharing groups allows us to investigate intra-group 
communication between strangers, and to examine whether the strong cooperation within groups to 
overcome free riding in other communication contexts persists if CPR groups are reassembled each 
period.2 
                                                 
2 Most studies have examined the effect of communication in inter-group games with fixed groups and a fixed prize 
(Rapoport and Bornstein 1989; Schram and Sonnemans 1996; Cason et al. 2012; Leibbrandt and Saaksvuori 2012 
and Zhang 2012).  Sutter and Strassmair (2009) examine the impact of communication in a group tournament in 
which the prize is not fixed and is paid by the losing team and shared equally in the winning team.  They find that 
free riding dominates when teams cannot communicate or can only communicate with members of other teams.  
Communication within teams, on the other hand, increases individual contributions and efficiency. Contrary to 
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We find that in our environment, organizing subjects into groups of four players who share output 
introduces sufficient free-riding incentives to achieve full efficiency.  Local communication within 
output-sharing groups decreases efficiency by countervailing the free-riding incentives induced by output 
sharing and enhancing between-group competition.  The reduced efficiency level with local 
communication and output sharing is, however, still significantly higher than simply allowing global 
communication among all resource users without output sharing. The efficiency-reducing effect of local 
communication is mitigated when random partners instead of fixed partners are sharing output over time, 
and is nearly eliminated when random partners are formed with users who belong to different 
communication groups. 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PREDICTIONS 
In each decision period every participant is required to allocate a fixed endowment of effort, e = 28, 
between a private activity, which provides a known return per unit of effort, r = 3.25, and a resource 
extraction activity that provides a return that depends upon the aggregate effort of all 12 participants.  The 
form of the yield function, parameters for the yield function, the opportunity cost of allocating the effort 
endowment, the effort endowment of participants in the CPR and the number of participants are identical 
to the values used in Schott et al. (2007).  In the interest of brevity the term effort will henceforth refer 
only to the effort devoted to resource extraction, unless another interpretation is clearly required by the 
context.  The experiment itself is conducted with neutral framing where effort is referred to as Investment 
and the two activities are identified as Market One and Market Two.   
The total output from resource extraction is 
𝑌 = 32.5𝑋 − 0.09375𝑋2 (1) 
where  is total output appropriated from the CPR and  is the sum of the resource-extraction effort of 
all participants. In the conventional CPR environment without output sharing, which we shall refer to as 
the CPR treatment, each appropriator from the CPR receives a share of total output that is proportional to 
his effort.3  Thus the individual profit function (in lab dollars) in the  CPR treatment is  
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑟(𝑒 − 𝑥𝑖) +
𝑥𝑖
𝑋
𝑌  (2) 
where  𝑥𝑖 is the harvesting effort of individual i.   
                                                                                                                                                             
theirs, in our experiment incentives are not monotonic as higher group contributions may lead to lower efficiency 
due to the congestion externality and the non-linear payoff of the CPR. 
3 In this context a treatment is a combination of factors.  Factors are variables that have two or more levels.  For 
example, in this experiment output sharing is a factor that can take on a Boolean value of true or false.  Similarly, 
local communication also is a factor that can take on a Boolean value of true or false.  For the CPR treatment both 
output sharing and local communication factors are false.  All of the factors used in this study along with their 
combinations (i.e. treatments) will be described below (see Treatment 2015).  
Y X
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Output sharing is introduced by dividing the 12 participants into 3 groups of 4.  The assignment 
of participants to groups may be fixed for the duration of the session or randomly remixed after each 
period.  Output is distributed to each group in proportion to the group’s effort, , and this output is 
distributed equally to all group members.  The return to each unit of output is normalized to one lab dollar 
(L$).  Given the group size of 4, the individual profit function (in lab dollars) under output sharing is  
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑟(𝑒 − 𝑥𝑖) +
1
4
𝑋𝑔
𝑋
𝑌. (3)  
Communication is introduced by allowing participants to exchange messages during a communication 
period that precedes each decision period.  Messages are exchanged by way of a chat window that appears 
on the computer screens of the participants.4  After the communication period, individuals make private 
and anonymous decisions about the number of units of effort they will allocate to appropriate from the 
CPR.  The remaining units of effort are automatically allocated to the private activity.  In the output-
sharing treatments participants share their output from the common pool amongst all output-sharing group 
members and are given a summary providing their earnings for the period, the average earnings of others 
in their group and the average earnings of others outside of their group. 
 Communication may be global or local. When it is global all messages appear on the screens of 
all 12 participants.  When it is local, participants are grouped into three separate communication groups.  
Only members of a specific communication group see the messages sent by others in that group.  When 
communication is both global and local, messages are sent from and received in separate windows.5  
Individuals are not required to adhere to any agreement they may reach during the communication period. 
Communication groups may be linked or unlinked to the output-sharing groups.  When output-
sharing and communication groups are linked, membership in the communication group is the same as 
membership in the output-sharing group.  Group membership is either fixed or randomly assigned after 
each period.  If groups are not linked the membership of the output-sharing groups are randomly remixed 
each period, while the membership of the communication group remains fixed.  Having randomly 
remixed communication groups and fixed output-sharing groups is not a configuration that we expect to 
find in the field and so we do not consider this.  
                                                 
4 Janssen et al. (2010) introduce chat-room communication into a CPR setting in which it is possible to destroy the 
CPR by over appropriation.  Chat-room communication is successful in forestalling destruction of the CPR and 
raising profit.  This result is similar to the results reported by Muller and Vickers (1996) who use face-to-face 
communication.  Bochet et al. (2006) compare different forms of communication in public goods laboratory 
experiments and find little difference between the effects of face-to-face communication and verbal communication 
through a chat room. 
5 Prior to the first decision round, individuals are given four minutes to send messages.  Prior to the second and third 
decision rounds, individuals are given three minutes to communicate.  Prior to the fourth round this is set at two 
minutes and from the fifth through the fifteenth rounds, communication is limited to one minute.  These time limits 
were based on debriefing subjects after several pilot sessions. 
gX
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To systematically examine the impact of communication on the effectiveness of the partnership 
solution to the commons problem, we investigate the interplay of five factors that may influence the level 
of system effort and hence the efficiency of outcomes.  These factors are Global Communication across 
all agents, Local Communication within groups, Fixed-Partners group assignment, Random-Partners 
group assignment after each period and Unlinked Communication and Output-Sharing Groups.  Each 
factor has two values: 1 if present and 0 otherwise.  Different combinations of these factor levels 
constitute the treatments we study.  The treatment for which every factor takes a value of 0 is the 
conventional CPR environment (with no communication and no output sharing).  Local Communication 
was only examined in the context of output sharing.  The treatments with Fixed-Partners and Random-
Partners output-sharing groups without communication that are introduced here are identical to those used 
in Schott et al. (2007) for the output-sharing environments with group size of 4.  We, therefore, study 
combinations of the five factors in twelve distinct treatments.  The treatments and their names are 
presented in Table 1, and are organized by communication and output-sharing characteristics.  Predictions 
for expected system effort for each of the twelve treatments are presented in subsections 2.1 through 2.5. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
2.1.  Equilibrium Predictions: No Communication with and without Output-Sharing Groups 
The basic CPR environment has no output sharing and no communication and presents a standard CPR 
dilemma.  In our environment, 12 subjects make independent appropriation-effort decisions in an attempt 
to maximize the profit function given by equation (2).  The Nash equilibrium for this environment has 
each appropriator exerting 24 units of effort to extraction from the CPR (288 for aggregate system effort). 
This is Prediction 1a. 
 In the Fixed-Partners and Random-Partners treatments with three four-person output-sharing 
groups each appropriator will maximize the profit function given by equation (3).  Output sharing induces 
appropriators to free-ride on the members of their output-sharing groups and this will constrain the over-
extraction present in this environment.  The unique group-Nash-equilibrium effort for each of the three 
four-person groups is 52, regardless of whether group membership is fixed over the session or randomly 
reassigned after each decision round.  This also is the surplus-maximizing allocation of effort.  There is 
no unique equilibrium allocation of group effort for individuals in the group but the equilibrium system 
effort of 156 is unique.6  This is Prediction 1b. 
2.2. Equilibrium Predictions: Global Communication with and without Output-Sharing Groups 
                                                 
6 See section 1 of Appendix III for a derivation of the equilibrium results.  See Schott et al. (2007) for the derivation 
of the optimal effort to allocate to appropriation from the common pool. 
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Communication can inform players of the beliefs of other players.  If actions reaffirm these beliefs, then 
cooperation may be sustainable in a repeated-game setting (see Hackett et al. 1994, pp. 107-108).  There 
are few behavioral models of decision-making in a CPR environment with communication from which we 
can derive a prediction about the role of communication.  However, for environments such as ours, the 
empirical evidence strongly suggests that treatments that include global communication without output 
sharing would reduce system effort and increase efficiency significantly relative to the basic CPR 
environment without global communication (see Ostrom et al., 1994, Chapters 7, 8; Muller and Vickers, 
1996).  Therefore, we expect that effort in the CPR with Global Communication will be less than 288 
units. This is Prediction 2a.  Because equilibrium output is predicted to be optimal in output-sharing 
environments without communication, the introduction of global communication is likely to have no 
effect and our expected system effort is 156 for the Fixed-Partners with Global Communication and 
Random-Partners with Global Communication treatments.  This is Prediction 2b. 
2.3. Equilibrium Predictions: Local Communication and Output Sharing with Linked Fixed and Random 
Partners 
When communication groups are linked with output-sharing groups it is possible for the participants 
within the output-sharing groups to discuss extraction strategies.  Joint and individual payoffs within a 
group will be maximized if the linked communication and output-sharing group acts as a single economic 
agent in competition against other output-sharing groups.  Thus, each group would maximize a profit 
function represented by equation (3) aggregated over its four group members. 
If all groups behave this way there will be a system-wide group profit-maximizing equilibrium 
consistent with a three-agent Nash equilibrium.  This will yield a unique group Nash equilibrium level of 
extraction effort of 78 units (234 units for the system).7  In this context, local communication among 
output-sharing group members will lead to the reduction of shirking and a system-wide increase in effort 
relative to the no-communication equilibrium for the Fixed-Partners or Random-Partners treatments.  
System effort for the Linked Fixed-Partners with Local Communication treatment will be 234 units.  This 
is Prediction 3a. 
However, the outcome will still be more efficient than that expected to be obtained in the basic 
CPR treatment.  Because communication requires repeated interactions and reinforcement it is less likely 
that the group profit-maximizing equilibrium will be realized when linked output-sharing groups are 
randomly reassigned each decision round than when they are fixed for the session. We therefore expect 
system effort to be between 156 and 234 for the Linked Random-Partners with Local Communication 
                                                 
7 There is no unique individual extraction effort.  See section 2 of Appendix III for this derivation.  
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treatment.  Randomizing partners over time might mitigate the effort-enhancing effect of local 
communication when communication and output-sharing groups are linked.  This is Prediction 3b.   
Generally, for linked local-communication and output-sharing groups, effort is expected to rise 
from levels without local communication.  This is Prediction 3c. 
2.4. Equilibrium Predictions: Global and Local Communication and Output Sharing with Linked Fixed 
and Random Partners 
For the Linked Random-Partners and Fixed-Partners with Local Communication treatments, allowing 
global communication may result in reduced effort.  The possible equilibrium range of outcomes of 
system effort for the Linked Random-Partners and Fixed-Partners with Global and Local Communication 
treatments is, at the high end, 234 units (78 units by each group; no change from the outcome for the 
Linked Fixed-Partners with Local Communication treatment).  At the low end, however, it is 156 units 
(52 units by each group; a coordinated efficient outcome enabled by the introduction of global 
communication resulting from the three groups entering into a three-player coalition-proof Nash 
equilibrium).  This optimal allocation of effort is described by Moldovanu (1992) and is derived for this 
particular parameter set in Appendix III.3.  Therefore, the introduction of global communication should 
result in system effort lower than in the absence of global communication for both the Fixed-Partners with 
Local Communication treatment (Prediction 4a) and for the Random-Partners with Local Communication 
treatment (Prediction 4b) 
Because of the coordination and adjustment issues described earlier for the Random-Partners 
treatments, it is more likely that the impact of global communication on system effort will be greater for 
the Fixed-Partners treatments.  This is Prediction 4c. 
2.5. Equilibrium Predictions: Global and Local Communication and Output Sharing with Unlinked 
Random Partners 
When local-communication groups are not linked with output-sharing groups it is not possible for the 
participants within the output-sharing groups to discuss extraction strategies among themselves.  If the 
appropriators of the CPR are able to communicate in fixed groups that are different from their output-
sharing groups, and if the output-sharing groups are randomly reassigned each period then we expect that 
system effort would be the same as for the Random-Partners treatment without communication.  
Therefore system effort for treatment with unlinked random partners and local communication is expected 
to be 156 units. 
Just as the introduction of local communication could lead to a reduction in shirking among 
members of an output-sharing group, the introduction of global communication could lead to a 
coordinated reduction of effort by all members of the CPR. The introduction of global communication is 
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not likely to alter the outcomes of those treatments that are already expected to realize an efficient system 
effort of 156 units.  Therefore the expected system effort for the Unlinked Random-Partners with Local 
Communication treatment and the Unlinked Random-Partners with Global and Local Communication 
treatment is 156.  These are Predictions 5a and 5b.  Associated with these predictions is the prediction 
that system effort will be lower in Unlinked Random-Partners treatments than in Linked Random-Partners 
treatments.  This is Prediction 5c. 
 All of the predicted system effort outcomes introduced above are presented in Table 2 along with 
the mean system effort resulting from the laboratory implementation of each of the twelve different 
treatments. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
2.6. Experimental Procedures 
A total of 576 subjects from McMaster University participated in the experiment.  The experiment 
consisted of 4 sessions for each of 12 treatments.  Of the 48 sessions whose results are reported in this 
paper, 9 were run earlier and reported in Schott et al. (2007): 3 sessions with the basic CPR treatment, 3 
Fixed-Partners treatments and 3 Random-Partners treatments.  Of the remaining 39 sessions, 36 sessions 
were run to introduce communication into the CPR environments.  The other 3 sessions were one each of 
the basic CPR treatment, the Fixed-Partners treatment and the Random-Partners treatment.8  In each 
session, 12 subjects participated in 15 decision rounds after three practice rounds.  Laboratory currency 
was converted at the exchange rate of L$200 for 1 Canadian dollar.  On average, subjects earned $23.82 
each (the standard deviation was $3.12 and earnings ranged from $15.42 to $30.30 including a $5 show-
up fee). Sessions were completed within 60 minutes in treatments without communication and within 90 
minutes in treatments with communication. 
 
3.  RESULTS 
Figure 1 presents the mean system effort by treatment.  The equilibrium predictions for each treatment 
and the realized mean system efforts for each treatment are provided in Table 2.  There are 48 
independent session observations.  We regress mean system effort, computed over the entire session, on 
the five factors and their interactions.   We use robust (heteroscedasticity consistent) standard errors.  The 
                                                 
8 Adding an additional observation to the data for the basic CPR treatment, the Fixed-Partners treatment and the 
Random-Partners treatment reported in Schott et al. (2007) does not affect the results obtained by Schott et al. 
(2007) that the system effort for each treatment is not different from the predicted values.  In all cases the p-values 
for the statistical tests are greater than 0.10  regardless of whether the additional observation is added. 
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constant in the regression is the mean system effort associated with the CPR treatment.  The regression 
results are presented in Table 3.  Statistical tests in the remainder of the paper use the robust standard 
errors from this regression unless otherwise noted.  Results from appropriate non-parametric versions of 
these tests are also presented.  We analyse the results under the five headings corresponding to the 
headings containing predictions in Section 2.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
3.1.  No Communication with and without Output Sharing 
In this sub-section we test hypotheses related to the basic CPR, the Fixed-Partners and the Random-
Partners treatments.  The hypotheses concern the performance of the participants in these treatments 
relative to the theoretical predictions for these treatments.  The parametric tests are based on the results 
reported in Table 3.  For example, the system mean effort in the Fixed-Partners treatment is equal to the 
sum of the coefficients for the constant (284.22; this represents the absence of output sharing and any 
communication, which is the CPR treatment) and the fixed-partners factor (-133.82).  This is equal to 
150.40.  Using the statistical software package STATA® we can test the difference between the sum of 
these two coefficients and 156, which is the predicted value for this treatment. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The mean system effort in the basic CPR treatment is 284.22.  This is not significantly different 
from the Nash equilibrium of 288 (F-test, p = 0.133; Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test, N = 4, p > 0.10).9  For 
the Fixed-Partners treatment mean system effort is 150.40 (3.5% below the predicted optimal effort and 
nearly 50% below the Nash equilibrium effort).  This is 134 units below system effort for the CPR 
treatment and below the system optimum of 156 but not significantly different from the latter (F-test, p = 
0.138; Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test, N = 4, p > 0.10).  The Random-Partners treatment results in mean 
effort of 152.77, 131 units below the system effort for the CPR treatment.  Again, this is not significantly 
different from the predicted optimal effort (F-test, p = 0.752; Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test, N = 4, p > 
0.10).  The means for the Fixed-Partners and Random-Partners treatments are not significantly different 
from each other (F-test, p = 0.828; Mann-Whitney U-test, N1 = 4, N2 = 4, p = 0.557) and both are 
significantly lower than the mean for the CPR treatment (F-tests, p = 0.000; Mann-Whitney U-tests, N1 = 
4, N2 = 4, p = 0.029). These relationships are displayed in Table 2 and by the three bars in the right-most 
column of Figure 1.  The data support Predictions 1a and 1b and establish Result 1. 
                                                 
9 All reported p-values are based on two-sided tests unless otherwise stated. One-sided tests are used only when the 
prediction implies a direction for the change. 
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Result 1.   The CPR treatment (with no communication or output sharing) leads to the over-
appropriation predicted as the Nash equilibrium for this environment.  The Fixed-
Partners and Random-Partners treatments (which implement an output-sharing 
mechanism) lead to full efficiency.  The assignment of partners to groups (fixed versus 
random) does not affect the effectiveness of the output-sharing mechanism in the absence 
of communication. 
3.2.  Global Communication with and without Output-Sharing Groups 
This sub-section concerns the performance of the participants in the basic CPR with Global 
Communication, the Fixed-Partners with Global Communication and the Random-Partners with Global 
Communication treatments relative to the theoretical predictions for these environments.  The parametric 
tests are based on the results reported in Table 3; for example, the effect of introducing global 
communication on system effort in the Fixed-Partners treatment is the sum of the coefficients of G (the 
global communication factor) and G & F (the interaction between the global communication and fixed-
partners treatments) in Table 3.  The significance of this sum, approximately 15, can be tested directly 
using these coefficients and their standard errors).   
Adding global communication to the basic CPR treatment reduces mean system effort by 22 units 
(about 8%) to 262.70. This effect is statistically significant in the direction predicted (t-test, p = 0.023; 
Mann-Whitney U-test, N1 = 4, N2 = 4, p = 0.057; both 1-sided) but a much larger reduction in effort (128 
units) is required to reach the system optimum of 156. Adding global communication to the Fixed-
Partners treatment actually raises mean effort by 15 units to 165 (about 10%).  The effect is not 
statistically significant (F-test, p = 0.151; Mann-Whitney U-test, N1 = 4, N2 = 4, p = 0.20).  When global 
communication is added to the Random-Partners treatment, mean effort rises by 16 units to 169 (again, 
about 10%).  This effect is not significant (F-test, p = 0.222; Mann-Whitney U-test, N1 = 4, N2 = 4, p = 
0.343).  These relationships are displayed in Table 2 and Figure 1 (the three bars in the second right 
column).  The data support Predictions 2a and 2b and establish Results 2 and 3. 
Result 2.  Global communication reduces effort and increases efficiency when there is no output 
sharing but effort remains much above optimal levels. 
Result 3. Global communication tends to increase effort and to reduce efficiency when introduced 
into the Fixed-Partners or Random-Partners treatments but the effect is small and not 
statistically significant.  Output sharing is somewhat less effective in the presence of 
Global communication, but continues to achieve near-optimal results.  
3.3. Local Communication and Output Sharing with Linked Fixed and Random Partners 
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We now turn to the effects of local communication and group assignment in the presence of output 
sharing.  We focus on the Linked Fixed-Partners and Random-Partners with and without Local 
Communication treatments presented in the two middle rows of Table 1.  The predicted values of system 
effort and the realized system effort for these treatments are presented in Table 2.   
From Table 2 we see that mean system effort for the Linked Fixed-Partners with Local 
Communication treatment is 227.92 units.  The predicted group profit maximizing system effort is 234 
units.  The six-unit difference is not statistically significant (F-test, p = 0.090, Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks 
test, N = 4, p > 0.10).  Also from Table 2 we see that the mean system effort for the Linked Random-
Partners with Local Communication treatment is 186.57 units.  This falls within the predicted range of 
156 to 234 units.  Both of these treatments generated mean system efforts that are significantly greater 
than the levels for the corresponding Fixed-Partners and Random-Partners treatments (without 
communication).  The difference is 77.52 units for the Linked Fixed-Partners treatment (F-test, p = 0.000, 
Mann-Whitney U-test, N1 = 4, N2 = 4, p = 0.029) and 33.80 for the Linked Random-Partners treatment 
(F-test, p = 0.006, Mann-Whitney U-test, N1 = 4, N2 = 4, p = 0.057).  The increase in effort is greater for 
the Linked Fixed-Partners with Local Communication treatment than for the comparable Random-
Partners treatment.  These results support Predictions 3a and 3b and 3c and establish Results 4 and 5. 
Result 4.  Local communication has a strong effort-enhancing effect when introduced into Fixed-
Partners and Random-Partners treatments with linked communication and output-
sharing groups. 
Result 5. Randomized group assignment mitigates but does not eliminate the effort-enhancing and 
efficiency-reducing effect of local communication. 
3.4.  Global and Local Communication and Output Sharing with Linked Fixed and Random Partners 
The introduction of global communication into Linked Fixed-Partners and Random-Partners with Local 
Communication treatments results in mean system effort falling from 227.92 units to 210.82 and 186.57 
to 180.90 respectively.  These differences are significant for the Fixed-Partners treatment but not for the 
Random-Partners treatment (F-tests, p = 0.036 and p = 0.652; Mann-Whitney U-test, N1 = 4, N2 = 4, p = 
0.057 and p = 0.686).  The reductions in mean system effort for the Linked Fixed-Partners and Linked 
Random-Partners with Local and Global Communication treatments are 17.10 and 5.67 units respectively.   
Although these differences are of the predicted magnitudes, they are not significantly different (F-test, p = 
0.443).  The data support Prediction 4a but not Predictions 4b and 4c.  Result 6 follows. 
Result 6. Global communication mitigates the effect of local communication, reducing effort and 
increasing efficiency in the Linked Fixed-Partners but not in the Random-Partners with 
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Local Communication Treatment. 
3.5. Global and Local Communication and Output Sharing with Unlinked Random Partners 
Table 2 presents the mean system efforts associated with Unlinked Random-Partners treatments with 
Local Communication and with Local and Global Communication.  For the treatment without Global 
Communication, mean system effort is 166.87 units, which is not statistically different from the predicted 
effort of 156 units (F-test, p = 0.215; Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test, N = 4, p > 0.10). With Global 
Communication, mean system effort is 176.47, which is statistically significantly different from the 
predicted effort level of 156 (F-test, p = 0.000; Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test, N = 4, p = 0.10).10  For both 
of these Unlinked treatments, mean system effort is less than for the comparable Linked Random-Partners 
(19.70 units and 4.43 units for treatments with and without global communication, 1-sided t-tests, p = 
0.051 for the former and p = 0.358 for the latter and Mann-Whitney U-test, N1 = 4, N2 = 4, p = 0.10 for 
the former and p = 0.557 for the latter).  As well, the system efforts for the unlinked treatments are less 
that for the comparable Linked Fixed-Partners treatments (61.05 units and 33.35 units for treatments with 
and without global communication; 1-sided t-tests, p = 0.001 and p = 0.004 and Mann-Whitney U-test, N1 
= 4, N2 = 4, p = 0.143 for both pairs).   The data support Predictions 5a, 5b and 5c and establish Result 7. 
Result 7.   Breaking the link between output-sharing and local communication groups nearly 
eliminates the effort-enhancing effect of local communication and leads to nearly optimal 
system effort that is much lower than in Linked Fixed-Partners and Linked Random-
Partners with Local Communication treatments (with or without Global Communication).  
3.6.  Unpredicted Results 
There are several outcomes that were not predicted that are worth presenting at this time.  The literature 
addressing the role of communication in managing the over-appropriation from the commons provides 
many examples of communication facilitating optimal or near optimal appropriation in laboratory 
environments.  While we predicted that global communication would lead to a reduction in appropriation, 
we made no prediction about the relative effectiveness of introducing global communication to the 
effectiveness of managing the commons with an output-sharing mechanism.  Our results show that 
introducing global communication into the basic CPR treatment reduces effort by 21.52 units.  The 
introduction of output sharing reduces effort by 133.82 units in the Fixed-Partners treatment and by 
131.45 units in the Random-Partners treatment.  These latter two reductions are significantly greater than 
the reduction associated with introducing global communication into the CPR treatment (F-tests, p = 
                                                 
10 A test comparing the data for the mean system efforts of the two treatments supports the null hypothesis that there 
is no difference between the two means (F-test, p = 0.299, Mann Whitney U-test, p = 0.343) 
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0.000; Mann-Whitney U-tests, p = 0.057 for the comparison with the Fixed-Partners treatment and p = 
0.0143 for the comparison with the Random-Partners treatment). 
Result 8.   Output sharing in the absence of communication is more effective at managing over-
appropriation from the commons than global communication.  
 A second relationship about which we made no prediction was how the increases in system effort 
anticipated with the introduction of local communication into the Fixed-Partners and Random-Partners 
treatments would compare with the lower system effort anticipated from the CPR with Global 
Communication treatment.  From Table 2 we see the CPR with Global Communication treatment results 
in mean system effort of 263 units.  The Linked Fixed-Partners and Linked Random-Partners with Local 
Communication treatments resulted in mean system efforts of 228 and 187 units respectively.  For both 
output-sharing treatments with local communication mean system effort is significantly lower than in the 
treatment with global communication but without output sharing (F-test, p = 0.003; Mann-Whitney U-
test, N1 = 4, N2 = 4, p = 0.057 for the treatment with fixed partners and F-test, p = 0.000; Mann-Whitney 
U-test, N1 = 4, N2 = 4, p = 0.029 for the treatment with random partners).  
Result 9.   The efficiency-diminishing effects of local communication in output-sharing treatments 
still results in the output-sharing treatments outperforming the CPR with Global 
Communication treatment.  
 
4.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In the absence of output sharing and communication we have a conventional CPR treatment with 
a larger number of participants than typically used in a laboratory experimental study.  In this treatment 
participants jointly apply the amount of system effort predicted as the Nash equilibrium.  It is 
significantly greater than the optimal system effort.  Introducing global communication across all subjects 
reduces system effort and enhances efficiency, although to a significantly lesser degree than found in the 
literature (see, for example, the small endowment environment in Ostrom et al. 1994).  Introducing an 
externality to offset the one inherent to the CPR through the use of output sharing proved to be far more 
effective in managing the laboratory CPR than introducing global communication and indeed achieves 
efficient levels of effort.  
However, the performance of the Fixed-Partners and Random-Partners treatments was 
substantially weakened when output sharing was augmented with local communication.  Local 
communication within output-sharing groups results in substantially increased extraction effort because it 
allows coordinated decision-making within output-sharing groups, reduces shirking and supports inter-
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group competition.  Although the presence of local communication within the Linked Fixed-Partners and 
Random-Partners treatments causes effort to rise above efficient levels these treatments are still 
significantly more efficient than our laboratory CPR with Global Communication treatment.  Global 
communication does, however, increase efficiency by reducing system effort from that realized in the 
Linked Fixed-Partners with Local Communication treatments.  
Therefore our laboratory evidence supports the use of mechanisms that introduce countervailing 
externalities in the management of environments involving social dilemmas.  In particular, we have found 
that managing a CPR with output-sharing groups can substantially improve extraction outcomes towards 
the social optimum, dominating solutions such as global communication, even when members of these 
output-sharing groups can communicate locally with one another.   
Our findings also have important implications for practical attempts to achieve decentralized 
management through output sharing in groups.  Local communication within output-sharing groups is a 
real threat to such management.  The findings from our unlinked and linked output-sharing groups with 
random assignment suggest that to effectively manage the commons, it is important to offset the 
coordinating effects of local communication by maintaining the anonymity of output-sharing group 
members and regularly reconstituting their membership.  Separating output-sharing groups from 
communication groups is particularly useful and randomizing output-sharing groups in a way that breaks 
the link between output sharing and communication is valuable.  This is an exercise that a regulatory body 
run by a central authority could do, although it may not always be feasible.  If recurrent local 
communication among output-sharing group members cannot be eliminated, an alternative action may be 
to reduce the number of output-sharing groups below the optimal number associated with a world of no 
communication.  The smaller number of output-sharing groups in the absence of global communication 
will lead to lower system effort than with the larger number of output-sharing groups (using the 
parameters in this experiment and the first-order conditions in Appendix III.2, three groups of four exert 
234 effort units of appropriation but two groups of six would exert 208 effort units).  The introduction of 
global communication may result in a further reduction of effort.  In either case, if only one can be used, 
output sharing trumps global communication as a management tool in the commons environment we have 
studied in the laboratory.  
 In this study we have carefully analyzed the impacts of local communication on the partnership 
solution to the common’s problem and the ability of global communication alone to solve the social 
dilemma.  In practice, different forms of communication will always be prevalent.  Our results suggest 
that management solutions need to properly account for various communication channels and group 
settings, particularly as the number of actors becomes larger and we cannot rely on even repeated “cheap 
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talk” to achieve efficient results.  Partnerships are one way of organizing and sharing a common pool 
resource such as certain fisheries, land and marine mammals, grazing lands or aquifers.  Hunter-gatherer 
cultures that have survived to modern times may owe their success to their practice of sharing their 
harvest caught by teams of hunters and fishers because extensive sharing reduces hunting effort 
sufficiently to protect common property from over-exploitation (Cherry et al. 2015; Kagi 2001; Sahlins 
1972).  Examples can be found in virtually all traditional societies, e.g. in Canada’s North for the harvest 
of fish, marine and land mammals (Collings et al. 1998; Harder and Wenzel 2012), fisheries in the South 
Pacific (Bender et al. 2002) and inshore fisheries in Japan that pool catch among vessels and share it 
equally (Yamamoto 1995; Platteau and Saki 2000).  The impact of the change in communication groups 
(through social media, web information and E-mail) and the change in sharing networks and type of 
partnerships on the use and conservation of common pool resources will need to be better understood and 
evaluated for more effective wildlife and fishery management solutions. 
Our insights on communication channels and the partnership solution can also be applied to 
evaluate and improve other management tools that introduce counteracting externalities in environments 
involving social dilemmas and unobservable effort.  For example, to avoid wasteful duplication in 
innovation tournaments, researchers often form joint ventures that compete to develop the best innovation 
and share the benefits within their own group (Baye and Hoppe 2003).  In professional sports leagues, 
revenue sharing is used to reduce overinvestment in attracting fans, talented players, coaches and to 
maintain the right competitive balance to maximize aggregate league revenue (Atkinson et al. 1988; Dietl 
et al. 2008).  Moreover, team regrouping is actually a common practice in the business world.  Quite often 
teams are formed when a specific problem arises, and dissolved right after the problem is solved. Such 
short-lived problem-solving teams are not only popular among law firms, consulting firms and medical 
group partnerships, but also are increasingly popular among manufacturing or service firms (Boning et al. 
2007).  This suggests that our proposal of randomizing output-sharing groups or to separate 
communication groups from output-sharing groups to offset the negative effect of local communication is 
not only of a theoretical interest, but also has a basis in practice as well.  
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    Table 1. Twelve treatments as a combination of output-sharing and communication factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 No 
Communication 
Global 
Communication 
Local 
Communication 
Global and Local 
Communication 
 
No Output 
Sharing 
 
CPR  CPR with Global 
Communication 
Not Applicable Not Applicable 
Output Sharing 
with Fixed 
Partners 
Fixed Partners Fixed Partners with 
Global 
Communication 
Linked Fixed 
Partners with 
Local 
Communication 
 
Linked Fixed 
Partners with 
Global and Local 
Communication 
Output Sharing 
with Random 
Partners 
Random Partners Random Partners 
with Global 
Communication 
Linked Random 
Partners with 
Local 
Communication 
 
Linked Random 
Partners with 
Global and Local 
Communication 
Output Sharing 
Not Linked to 
Fixed Commun-
ication Groups 
Not Applicable Not Applicable Unlinked 
Random Partners 
with Local 
Communication 
Unlinked 
Random Partners 
with Global and 
Local 
Communication 
 
Note: The four shaded cells in Table 1 represent configurations of the communication and output-
sharing conditions that cannot exist. The remaining twelve cells represent the twelve treatments studied 
in this experiment. We could have examined both output sharing groups with random partners and 
unlinked fixed communication groups and output sharing groups with fixed partners and unlinked 
random communication groups but chose to only examine the former because we believe the fixed 
communication groups are most common in the field (representative of costless communication within 
social or community groups). These are described in more detail in the subsections 2.1 through 2.5. 
Instructions for unlinked random partners with local communication treatment are included in Appendix 
I.  Screen shots for the computer-mediated environment are included in Appendix II. 
table Click here to download table RevisedTables041116.docx 
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Table 2.  Mean system effort and predictions (in parentheses) for mean system effort by treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 No 
Communication 
Global 
Communication 
Local 
Communication 
Global and Local 
Communication 
 
No Output Sharing 284.22 
(288) 
 
262.70 
(< 288) 
 
Not Applicable Not Applicable 
Output Sharing with 
Fixed Partners 
150.40 
(156) 
 
164.93 
(156) 
 
227.92 
(234) 
 
210.82 
(234 ≥ effort ≥ 156) 
 
Output Sharing with 
Random Partners 
152.77 
(156) 
 
169.05 
(156) 
 
186.57 
(234 ≥ effort ≥ 156) 
 
180.90 
(< with only local 
communication) 
 
Output Sharing Not 
Linked to Fixed 
Communication 
Groups 
Not Applicable Not Applicable 166.87 
(156) 
 
176.47 
(156) 
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Table 3. OLS regression for system effort with all factors and interactions  
 
 
Factors and Interactions 
 
 
Coefficient 
 
Constant (CPR treatment with No Output Sharing and No Communication)  
 
 
284.22*** 
(2.458) 
Global Communication (G) 
 
-21.517* 
(10.445) 
Local Communication (L) 
 
77.517*** 
(5.076) 
Fixed Partners (F) 
 
-133.817*** 
(4.433) 
Random Partners (R) 
 
-131.450*** 
(10.431) 
Unlinked Communication Groups and Output-Sharing Groups (UL) 
 
-19.700* 
(10.185) 
G & L -31.633** 
(12.644) 
L & R -43.717*** 
(12.580) 
G & R 37.800** 
(16.747) 
G & F 36.050** 
(14.391) 
G & L & R 9.683 
(22.059) 
G & L & R & UL 15.267 
(15.434) 
Number of Observations 48 
R-squared  0.9102 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%.  The upper case letters in parentheses are identifiers for the different factors.  
Interaction terms are identified by factor identifiers separated by an ampersand (for example, G & L 
is the interaction of global and local communication).  The interactions L & F, L & UL, R & UL, G 
& UL, G & L & UL, G & R & UL, G & L & F and L & R & UL were dropped because of 
collinearity. 
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APPENDICES TO BE MADE AVAILABLE ONLINE 
  
APPENDIX I 
 
INSTRUCTIONS (unlinked random partners and local communication treatment) 
 
Introduction 
 
You are about to participate in a project about economic decision-making. You will be asked to make 
decisions about the investment of resources between two activities, which will be referred to as Markets 1 
and 2. The amount of money you will earn in today’s session will depend on your investment in Market 1 
and the sum of your and others’ investments in Market 2. Your earnings will be paid to you privately, in 
cash, at the end of the session. The money for this project is provided by several funding agencies. 
 
The Environment 
 
During this session you and 11 other people will have to make decisions to invest resources in two 
markets. You will participate in 18 decision rounds, called periods.  The first 3 periods will be for practice. 
The last 15 periods will determine your earnings at the end of the session.  
 
At the start of the first round the 12 participants in the session will be divided into 3 groups of 4 people. 
The distribution of people to groups is random and none of the participants will know who is in his or her 
group. After each of the 18 periods is over, we will scramble the membership of all the groups, so that 
everyone is playing in a new group every period. Your earnings will depend upon the investment decisions 
that you make, the investment decisions that the members of your group make, and the investment 
decisions that the members of the other groups make. Your earnings in each round will be reported to you 
in Laboratory Dollars (L$). These will be converted to Canadian Dollars (C$) at the end of the session 
using the relationship 0.005×L$ = C$. 
 
The Markets 
 
At the beginning of each period you and each of the other participants will be given 28 tokens to invest. 
These tokens may be distributed in any way you wish between the two markets. Each period you will 
decide how many tokens to invest in Market 2. Whatever you do not invest in Market 2 will be 
automatically invested in Market 1.  
 
Each token you invest in Market 1 yields a fixed return of L$3.25. This return per token is independent of 
the amount you invest or others invest in Market 1. Your return from Market 2 depends on the total 
investment in this market by all participants in the session. 
 
Although you keep all of your return from Market 1, you and the rest of your group will pool your returns 
from Market 2 and share them equally. Thus your payoff from Market 1 equals your return from Market 1 
and your payoff from Market 2 equals your share of your groups’ returns from Market 2. Your total payoff 
for the period is the sum of your payoffs in the two markets.  
 
Numerical Example 
 
In today’s session there will be 3 groups of 4 participants. Each participant will have an endowment of 28 
tokens to distribute between investments in Market 1 and Market 2. 
 
Suppose you invest 11 tokens in Market 2. Assume that each of the other members of your group invests 
Appendix Click here to download attachment to manuscript CPR August
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19 tokens. Assume that each of the other participants (not in your group) invests 17 tokens in Market 2. 
Here is how your payoffs in Market 1 and Market 2 are calculated: 
 
You invest 11 tokens in Market 2, leaving 17 tokens to be invested in Market 1. 
 
The total investment in Market 2 by the other members of your group is 3×19 = 57 tokens. 
 
The total investment in Market 2 by the participants not in your group is 8×17 = 136 tokens. 
 
The total investment in Market 2 by all participants is 11 + 57 + 136 = 204 tokens. 
 
The Market 2 Total Return Table shows the total and average return per token for a number of values of 
total investment in Market 2. If 204 tokens are invested in Market 2 the total return will be L$2728.50. 
The average return per token is L$13.375.  
 
         
 
Your return from the 11 tokens you invested in Market 2 is L$13.375 ×11 = L$147.125. The total return 
from the 19 tokens invested by each of the other members of your group is L$13.375 ×19 = L$254.125. 
Therefore the total return to your group is L$909.50. Since you share this return equally, your total payoff 
from Market 2 is L$909.50/4 = L$227.375.   
 
The constant return in Market 1 is L$3.25 per token. Therefore the return from the 17 tokens you invested 
in Market 1 is 3.25×17 = L$55.25. 
 
Your total payoff from both markets combined is L$55.25 + L$227.38 = L$282.63. 
 
Each of your group partners total payoff, on the other hand, is L$227.38 + 9×L$3.25 = L$256.63. 
 
To simplify these calculations, the computer will show you an abbreviated Payoff Table for Market 2 and 
a Payoff Wizard which will calculate the exact payoff for any combination of your investment, the average 
investment by others that are in your group, and the average investment by others that are not in your 
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group. The abbreviated Payoff Table will be similar to the Payoff Table for Market 2 shown below.   
 
  
 
The payoff based upon the numbers given in the previous section can be easily calculated from this Payoff 
Table. Since your group invested 11 + 57 = 68 tokens, the average investment by people in your group is 
68/4 = 17 tokens. Locate the column headed “17”. Since the other participants not in your group each 
invested 17 on average, locate the row labeled “17”. The number at the intersection of these rows and 
columns (227.38) is your share of your group’s return from Market 2. Adding L$55.25 (your payoff from 
Market 1) to this gives your total payoff of L$282.63.  
 
Practice Periods 
 
To let you learn more about the environment we are going to run 3 practice periods. The results from 
these periods will not contribute to your final earnings. If you have any questions during these 3 periods, 
please raise your hand and we will answer them.  
 
After the 3 periods are over, we will scramble members of the groups and begin the 15 periods which 
contribute to your earnings. 
 
(Monitor starts the session) 
Please examine your computer screens. In the upper right hand frame you will find a Payoff Table like the 
one in your instructions. Locate the cell showing your Market 2 payoff if you invest 11 tokens, the others 
in your group invest 19 tokens and the people not in your group invest 17 tokens each. To find the cell you 
must calculate the average investment made by all of the members of your group (11 by you and 19 by 
each of the other 3 is 68 tokens; divided by 4 equals 17 tokens). Under these hypothetical conditions, your 
payoff from Market 2 would be L$227.38.  
 
Please click on this cell. Now look at the Wizard at the upper left hand side of the screen.  Note that the 
numbers from the Payoff Table have been entered into the Wizard. Your investment is identified as 17 
tokens, the average investment of the others in your group is identified as 17 tokens, and the average 
investment of others not in your group is identified as 17 tokens. Note the displayed payoff from Market 2 
is L$ 227.38 and your displayed Total Payoff is L$263.13. 
 
Now use the spin-edit box to change your investment to 11 tokens and the average investment by others in 
your group to 19 tokens. Note that your payoff from Market 2 has not changed, but your Total Payoff has 
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increased to L$282.63. This total payoff is identical to the payoff you calculated in the previous example, 
in which your group average investment was 17, but you invested 11 tokens, while each of the others in 
your group invested 19 tokens. 
 
You can calculate the payoff for any other combinations of investments by altering the numbers in the spin 
edit box.  
 
You make your decision by filling in the form at the lower left of your screen. Notice that the spin-edit 
box on this form shows the last value you entered into the Wizard. You can accept this value or change it 
any way you please. After you have entered your desired investment decision, push the Press Here When 
Done button. 
 
We are now ready to start the practice sessions. Please make your decisions and submit them. 
 
(after results are shown) 
 
The computer screens are now showing the results of the period. When you are finished examining them, 
please press Done 
 
(after screens change) 
 
You are now ready to start the second practice period. Notice the results from last period are shown on the 
history page on the right hand side of your screen. Remember that the groups have all been scrambled and 
you will be in a new group every period. Please make your decisions and submit them as before. 
 
(after results are shown) 
 
The results of the second practice period are now being shown. Please examine them and then proceed to 
the third practice period. 
 
(after third period begins) 
 
This is the third and final practice period. Please make your decisions and submit them as before. When 
the results of the third session appear, do not press the Done until you have read the remaining 
instructions.  
 
(after the results appear) 
 
Communication 
    
Prior to the first paid period, you will be able to send messages to other members in your group. Everyone 
in your group will see the messages you send. To see how, please click now on the messenger tab in the 
lower portion of your screen. The messenger window will open. Then click on the lower (white) part of 
the box and type “hello”. Please everyone type “hello” now. Then click the ‘Send’ button, so that others in 
your group can read your message. If you look at the messenger window you will see how many seconds 
remain for exchanging messages. The messenger window will be active for four minutes before the first 
paid period. 
 
After the exchange of messages you will make investment decisions. Although you will make investment 
decision in a new group each period, the composition of your communication group is the same across all 
periods. More specifically, before making decisions, you will always be able to send messages to the same 
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group as you communicate with in the first paid period.  
 
Prior to the second and third decision periods, this is set at three minutes. Prior to the fourth round this is 
set at two minutes and from the fifth through the fifteenth rounds, communication is limited to one minute. 
Now please switch to the main window by clicking on the background. 
 
Although we will record the messages your group sends to each other, only the people in your group will 
see them. In sending messages, you should follow two basic rules: (1) Be civil to one another and do not 
use profanities, and (2) Do not identify yourself in any manner. The communication channel is intended to 
discuss your choices and should be used that way. 
Please do not close any window at any time because that will cause delays and problems with the 
software. 
  
Paid Periods 
 
We are now about to begin the paid portion of the session. We will scramble the membership of all the 
groups so that your group will consist of a completely new set of 4 people in each of the next 15 
periods. 
 
If you have any questions, please ask them now. 
Please examine the results of the third practice period and press Done. When everyone has done this, the 
first paid period will begin automatically. Please continue to follow the computer prompts until the end of 
the session. 
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APPENDIX II 
 
SCREEN SHOTS 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.1 Decision Screen 
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Figure II.2 Outcome Screen 
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APPENDIX III 
 
III. 1. Equilibrium for CPR Environment when Individuals in Groups Attempt to Maximize 
Individual Profits when Output Sharing is Used as a Management Instrument 
 
Total output as a function of “effort” of all individuals using the CPR ( ) is 
 
. 
 
Individual Profit as a function of individual effort ( ), the effort by members of the individual’s group  
( ) and the effort by all individuals using the CPR ( ) is 
 
,  
 
where  is the number of people in the individual’s group. If  then . 
 
Differentiating π with respect to  and setting this equal to zero yields 
 
. 
 
This reduces to  
. 
 
There is an equation like this one for each member of each group. When the groups have more than one 
member, the equations for all of the members in any particular group are identical. This results in three 
unique equations of the form 
 
, 
 
where  is the group identifier. 
 
In the case of three four-person groups, there would be three equations with three unknowns, , , 
and . The solution will be 
 
. 
 
The important result is that there is not a unique equilibrium quantity for the individual. The equilibrium 
condition requires that the sum of the contributions of the individuals in a group equals a unique value. 
There is a unique group Nash equilibrium allocation of effort to appropriation from the common pool.  In 
this case, the unique group Nash equilibrium amount of effort is 52.  The system effort is 156. 
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III. 2. Equilibrium for CPR Environment when Individuals in Groups Attempt to Maximize Group 
Profits when Output Sharing is Used as a Management Instrument 
 
Individual Profit as a function of individual effort ( ), the effort by members of the individual’s group  
( ) and the effort by all individuals using the CPR ( ) is 
 
. 
 
Profit for the group is 
 
. 
 
Differentiating  with respect to  and setting this equal to zero yields 
 
. 
 
When there are twelve appropriators from the common pool and , there are three output-sharing 
groups and X= 3𝑋𝑔, therefore 
 
. 
 
The Nash equilibria in the situations described above result in the following values. The important result is 
that there is not a unique equilibrium quantity for the individual.  The equilibrium condition requires that 
the sum of the contributions of the individuals in a group equals a unique value.  There is a unique group 
Nash equilibrium allocation of effort to appropriation from the common pool.  In this case the unique 
group Nash equilibrium amount of effort is 78.  The system effort is 234. 
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III. 3.  A Coalition-Proof Equilibrium for a CPR Environment with three Output-Sharing Groups, 
Local communication and Global communication 
 
We can also derive a coalition proof equilibrium for three output-sharing groups that communicate locally 
as well as globally (our treatment FFC).  In this environment there are only three possible configurations 
of groups.  There can be a coalition of three groups, a coalition of two groups or no coalition.  If a 
coalition of three groups forms and each group exerts 52 units of effort, there will be no incentive for one 
of the groups to leave the coalition.  In this case the socially efficient outcome of 156 is also the coalition-
proof equilibrium as the following table indicates: 
 
Results with n = 3;  e = 112 There is a Coalition Proof Equilibrium with a Coalition of 3 with Global and/or Local communication  
(average individual payoffs are one-quarter of group payoffs) 
 
 Total 
Effort 
Total  
Yield 
Coalition 
Yield 
Coalition 
Outside 
Coalition 
Total 
Follower 
Yield 
Follower 
Outside 
Follower 
Total 
Coalition 
Effort 
Follower 
Effort 
Total 
Coalition 
1L 
245.33 2330.67 1064.00 0.00 1064.00 633.33 147.33 780.67 112.00 66.67 245.33 
 
Coalition 
2L 
234.00 2471.63 823.88 110.50 934.38 823.88 110.50 934.38 78.00 78.00 234.00 
 
Coalition 
1N 
234.00 2471.63 823.88 110.50 934.38 823.88 110.50 934.38 78.00 78.00 234.00 
 
Coalition 
2N 
234.00 2471.63 823.88 110.50 934.38 823.88 110.50 934.38 78.00 78.00 234.00 
 
Coalition 
3 
156.00 2788.50 929.50 195.00 1124.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 52.00 52.00 156.00 
 
Optimal 156.00 2788.50 232.38 48.75 281.13 232.38 48.75 281.13 13.00 13.00 156.00 
            
Notes: 
Coalition 1L: Outcome with 1 group as leader and 2 followers; this is a corner solution; this is not coalition proof.  
Coalition 2L: Outcome with a 2-group coalition as leader and 1 follower; this is an equilibrium, but it is not coalition proof. 
Coalition 1N: Nash equilibrium with three 1-group coalitions; this is coalition proof to marginal changes of coalition size; this is the group profit-maximization 
outcome. 
Coalition 2N: Nash outcome given one 2-group coalition and one 1-group coalition: this is not coalition proof. 
Coalition 3: Nash outcome given one 3-group coalition; this is a coalition-proof equilibrium 
Optimal: Payoffs in this line are the average individual payoffs. 
“Yield” is the return from the CPR to the coalition or to the follower. 
“Outside” is the return to effort not allocated to extraction from the CPR. 
 
For a CPR environment with three output-sharing groups that cannot communicate locally, but can 
communicate globally, the socially efficient outcome of 156 units of effort is the coalition-proof 
equilibrium. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Table V.1.  p-values for pairwise comparisons of environmental variables for F-tests from system effort 
OLS regression with robust standard errors 
 
Note: The p-values are for two-tailed F-tests based on pairwise comparisons of environments reported in 
Table 2.  Significantly different treatments are identified by bolded p-values. 
 
B: no output sharing, no communication (baseline treatment) 
F: output sharing with fixed partners, no communication 
R: output sharing with random partners, no communication 
FF: output sharing with fixed partners, local communication 
RR: output sharing with random partners, local communication 
RF: output sharing with random partners, unlinked local communication  
BC: baseline with global communication 
FC: output sharing with fixed partners, global communication 
RC: output sharing with random partners, global communication 
FFC: output sharing with fixed partners, local & global communication 
RRC: output sharing with random partners, local & global communication 
RFC: output sharing with random partners, unlinked local communication & global communication 
 
 
 
 
 F R FF RR RF BC FC RC FFC RRC RFC 
B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F  0.827 0.000 0.000 0.085 0.000 0.150 0.045 0.000 0.013 0.000 
R   0.000 0.005 0.294 0.000 0.378 0.220 0.000 0.069 0.030 
FF    0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.000 
RR     0.059 0.000 0.049 0.084 0.009 0.652 0.110 
RF      0.000 0.879 0.856 0.000 0.327 0.297 
BC       0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FC        0.741 0.000 0.276 0.240 
RC         0.000 0.400 0.404 
FFC          0.029 0.000 
RRC           0.704 
